Selection-Channel-Aware Rich Model for Steganalysis of Digital Images

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Steganography and steganalysis

Steganography is the art of secret communication



Steganographer's job

Modify a cover image to stego image so that it contains a secret message (by flipping LSBs, changing DCT coefficients, ...). **Goal**: make the embedding changes statistically undetectable.

► Warden's job: Distinguish between cover and stego images by building a detector. If cover source is known, the best detection is achieved using feature-based steganalysis and machine learning.

Steganography in practice

Sender

Specifies the cost of changing each pixel in the cover, $\rho_{ij} \ge 0$. Embeds the message by minimizing the distortion in the form of a sum of costs of all changed pixels, $\sum_{x_{ij} \neq y_{ij}} \rho_{ij}$. Problem is equivalent to source coding with a fidelity constraint.

Can be implemented with syndrome-trellis codes that operate near the rate–distortion bound [Filler 2010].

Recepient

Extracts the secret message using the parity-check matrix of the shared syndrome-trellis code.

Content-adaptive steganography

• Embedding prefers changing pixels in textured / noisy areas





cover

stego changes

Content-adaptive steganography

Embedding prefers changing pixels in textured / noisy areas



cover

stego changes

Selection channel

► Formally, the selection channel are the probabilities of changing pixel *ij*:

$$ho_{ij}=rac{e^{-\lambda
ho_{ij}}}{1+e^{-\lambda
ho_{ij}}},$$

- $\lambda \ge 0$ parameter controlling the payload
 - ρ_{ij} pixel "costs" computed from cover image x
 - costs dictated by content + noise
- Since stego changes are subtle: ρ_{ij} from cover $\approx \rho_{ij}$ from stego image

Selection channel recoverability, WOW



[Holub, IEEE WIFS 2012] Designing Steganographic Distortion Using Directional Filters

Selection channel recoverability, S-UNIWARD



[Holub, EURASIP 2014] Universal Distortion Function for Steganography in an Arbitrary Domain

Selection channel recoverability, HILL



[Li, ICIP 2014] A New Cost Function for Spatial Image Steganography

Using Selection Channel for Steganalysis

- [BOSS, IH 2011] no successful attack on HUGO based on approximate knowledge of the selection channel.
- [Schöttle et al., WIFS 2012] improved WS detector for naive content-adaptive LSB replacement.
- ► [Denemark, SPIE 2014] first successful attack on modern stego scheme that utilized an artifact in selection channel.
- [Tang, ACM IH & MMSec 2014] thresholded SRM first general purpose attack using selection channel.
- ► [Denemark, WIFS 2014] maxSRMd2 (this presentation)



 $\operatorname{cover} \boldsymbol{X}$



noise residual z

- $z_{ij} = x_{i,j} \operatorname{Pred}(\mathcal{N}(x_{ij}))$
- Pred(*N*(x_{ij})) ... pixel predictor on neighborhood *N*
- linear and min/max filters
- *z_{ij}* has narrower dynamic range
- better SNR (stego noise to image content)



quantized residual r

- ► $z_{ij} \rightarrow r_{ij} = Q_{\mathcal{Q}}(z_{ij})$ ► $\mathcal{Q} = \{-Tq, -(T-1)q, \dots, Tq\}$
- ► *T* ... truncation threshold
- ▶ q ... quantization step (SRM uses q = 1, 1.5, 2)



- collect quartets of values
- horizontal and vertical directions



- ► 4*D* co-occurrence matrix
- symmetrization

Co-occurrences in maxSRMd2



- collect quartets of values
- horizontal and vertical directions
- twice as many symmetries

Co-occurrences in maxSRMd2



Detection gain w.r.t. SRM (WOW)



Detection gain w.r.t. SRM (S-UNIWARD)



Detection gain w.r.t. SRM (HILL)



Co-occurrences in thresholded SRM (tSRM)



- collect quartets of values
- horizontal and vertical directions

Co-occurrences in thresholded SRM (tSRM)



- ► 4*D* co-occurrence matrix
- utilize only some values
- symmetrization

Comparison between maxSRMd2 and tSRM (WOW)



Comparison between maxSRM and tSRM (S-UNIWARD)



Selection-Channel-Aware Rich Model for Steganalysis of Digital Images



- maxSRM is a general-purpose feature set capable of utilizing the selection channel for detection of content-adaptive steganography
- Overly content-adaptive embedding hurts security (WOW)
- When designing steganography, selection-channel attacks need to be considered
 - ▶ often, improvement w.r.t. SRM leads to bigger loss w.r.t. maxSRM
- Matlab code available from http://dde.binghamton.edu/download